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LEARNING TO FORECAST THE EXCHANGE RATE: 





In this paper, we investigate the behavior of the exchange rate within the framework of an 
asset pricing model. We assume boundedly rational agents who use simple rules to forecast 
the future exchange rate. They test these rules continuously using two learning mechanisms. 
The first one, the fitness method, assumes that agents evaluate forecasts by computing their 
past profitability. In the second mechanism, agents learn to improve these rules using 
statistical methods. First, we find that both learning mechanisms reveal the fundamental value 
of the exchange rate in the steady state. Second, both mechanisms mimic regularities 
observed in the foreign exchange markets, namely exchange rate disconnect and excess 
volatility. Fitness learning rule generates the disconnection at different frequencies, while the 
statistical method has this ability only at the high frequencies. Statistical learning can produce 
excess volatility of magnitude closer to reality than fitness learning but can also lead to 
explosive solutions. 
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April 2006 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Exchange rate economics has been dominated by the rational expectations eﬃcient
market theory. As the empirical evidence against this theory has tended to accumulate
over time1, researchers have increasingly looked for alternative modelling approaches.
One of these approaches challenges the assumptions about the way the agents form their
expectations. In this paper, we focus on this approach.
We investigate the behavior of the exchange rate within the framework of a stan-
dard asset pricing model. We assume that the market expectations, within this model,
are formed by boundedly rational agents. We take the view that the rational expec-
tations assumption puts too great an informational burden on individual agents. As
argued by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Kahneman (2002), agents experience
cognitive problems in processing information. As a result, they use simple forecasting
rules (heuristics). We assume that they can use two diﬀerent forecasting rules and com-
bine them to form their expectations about the future exchange rate. The ﬁrst one will
be called a fundamentalist forecasting rule, the second one a chartist rule (technical
analysis). Then, we assume that the agents test these rules continuously. This testing
procedure is the mechanism by which we introduce discipline on the behavior of indi-
vidual agents. We specify two alternative testing procedures (learning mechanisms). In
the ﬁrst one, agents select the rules based on a ﬁtness method in the spirit of Brock
and Hommes (1997), (1998). This mechanism assumes that agents evaluate forecasts by
computing their past proﬁtability. Accordingly, they increase (reduce) the weight of one
rule if it is more (less) proﬁtable than the alternative rule. In the second mechanism,
agents learn to improve these rules using statistical methods based on the literature of
learning in macroeconomics (e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the behavior of the exchange rate under
diﬀerent learning rules, and to compare the capacity of these rules to mimic regularities
observed in the foreign exchange markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, we develop
the baseline model of the exchange rate and we specify the way agents form their
expectations about the future exchange rate. In section three, we introduce the learning
1See Sarno and Taylor(2002), De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2006).
2rules of the agents. In section four, we study the steady state properties of the models.
Section ﬁve presents a numerical analysis of the dynamics of the exchange rate. We
carry out sensitivity analysis of the two learning models in section six. Section seven
confronts the statistical properties of the exchange rate under the two learning rules
with the data. Section eight provides some concluding remarks.
2 Exchange rate model and agents’ expectations
2.1 Asset pricing model of the exchange rate
We model the market exchange rate using an asset pricing view of the exchange rate.
This allows us to write the exchange rate as:
st = s∗
t + b(Etst+1 − st) (1)
where st is the log level of the exchange rate in period t,d e ﬁned as the domestic price of
a unit of foreign currency and s∗
t deﬁnes the set of fundamentals. Equation (1) expresses
the market exchange rate as the sum of the current fundamentals and the expected
change of the market. Model (1) can be viewed as the reduced form of the monetary
model linking the exchange rate to money supplies and incomes. It can also correspond
to the models of stock valuation, where s∗
t plays a role of dividends and b is a discount
factor applied to expected future capital gains. We rewrite this equation in the following
form:
st =( 1− α)s∗
t + αEtst+1 + ηt (2)
where α = b
1+b,a n d1−α = 1
1+b. Thus, the market exchange rate is a convex combina-
tion of the fundamental rate and the expectations of the future market exchange rate.






.N o t e t h a t α can be interpreted as a discount factor on the future
market exchange rate expectations and thus 0 <α<1. We also assume that the log
fundamental s∗
t is driven by a random walk, i.e.
s∗
t = s∗
t−1 +  t (3)






Solving Model (2) assuming rational expectations of agents yields:
st =( 1 − α)s∗
t + α(Et (1 − α)s∗
t+1 + α(1 − α)s∗
t+2 + α2 (1 − α)s∗
t+3 (4)
+... + αn−1 (1 − α)s∗
t+n + ηt+1 + ηt+2 + ... + ηt+n)+αnEtst+n + ηt
Note that for stationarity of the above solution, we need α<1. Using the deﬁnition
of the fundamental process in equation (3),w eﬁnd:
st =( 1 − α)s∗
t + α((1 − α)s∗
t + α(1 − α)s∗
t + α2 (1 − α)s∗
t (5)
+... + αn−1 (1 − α)s∗
t)+αnEtst+n + ηt
Finally, letting n →∞and assuming the absence of rational bubbles, namely that
limn−→∞ αnEtst+n =0 ,w eﬁnd:
st =( 1− α)s∗
t + αs∗
t + ηt = s∗
t + ηt (6)
We ﬁnd that under rational expectations assumption, the market exchange rate is driven
by the current fundamental rate and some unexpected noise.
2.2 The expectations formation
In this section, we specify the mechanism determining expectations of agents and we
depart from the assumption of rational expectations. We take the view that the rational
expectations assumption puts too great an informational burden on individual agents.
Agents experience cognitive problems in processing information. As a result, they use
simple forecasting rules (heuristics). They are willing to learn however. Their learning
process will then lead them to put diﬀerent weights on the rules they are using.
We start by assuming that agents can use two diﬀerent forecasting rules. One will
be called a fundamentalist forecasting rule, the other a chartist rule (technical analysis).
Thus we introduce heterogeneity in the agents’ forecasts2.
2Survey data indicate that the expectations in the exchange market are not homogeneous (Taylor
and Allen (1992), Frankel and Froot (1990), Bénassy-Quéré, Larribeau and Macdonald (1999)). These
survey data point out that the FOREX traders do not stick to one single trading rule. They alter and
even mix the trading rules according to the realized proﬁts.
4When using a fundamentalists rule, agents compare the market exchange rate with














where ˜ ∆st+1 is deﬁned as st+1 − st−1. We assume here that boundedly rational agents
do not know st at t. We can rewrite also the expectations for st+1 :
E
f






In this sense, they follow a negative feedback rule: where ψ>0 is a parameter describing
the speed at which the agents expect the exchange rate to return to its fundamental
value.
The second forecasting rule agents use is a chartist rule. We assume that this takes







where ∆st−1 = st−1 − st−2. Alternatively we can write:
Ec
t (st+1)=st−1 + β∆st−1 (10)
T h ed e g r e eo fe x t r a p o l a t i o ni sg i v e nb yt h ep a r a m e t e rβ>0. Clearly, more sophisticated
rules could be speciﬁed. Here we focus on the simplest possible chartist rule.
The agents combine these two rules with their respective weights. As a result, the








t st+1 and Ec
tst+1 are the mean-reverting (fundamentalist) and the extrapolative
(chartist) components, respectively, ωf is the weight given to the fundamentalist rule,
ωc is the weight given to the chartist rule and ωf + ωc =1 .
The timing in this model should be speciﬁed carefully. Since our agents are boundedly
rational, they do not know the current exchange rate that will be the outcome of their
forecast. The last available information they have about the exchange rate is the one
5prevailing in the previous period. Thus, when they make a forecast in period t they use
the information up to period t − 1.
We now substitute equation (8) and (10) into equation (11) and the latter into
equation (2).T h i sy i e l d s :
st =( 1− α)s∗






+ αωc [st−1 + β∆st−1]+ηt (12)
3 Learning mechanisms of agents
In our world of bounded rationality, agents use simple rules described in the previous
section. However, they test these rules continuously. This testing procedure is the
mechanism by which discipline is imposed on the behavior of individual agents. We
specify two alternative testing procedures (learning mechanisms). In the ﬁrst one, agents
select the rules based on a ﬁtness method. In the second mechanism, agents learn
to improve these rules using statistical methods. The main diﬀerence between both
learning strategies lies in the assumption which parameters are time-varying. In the
ﬁtness learning, the market expectations change because of the shifts of the weights
on two rules, while the parameters ψ and β are ﬁxed. In the statistical learning, the
opposite takes place. The weights on two rules are equal and constant, and the agents
estimate the parameters of the rules ψ and β.
3.1 Fitness mechanism
The ﬁrst learning mechanism is based on a ﬁtness criterion in the spirit of Brock and
Hommes (1997), (1998), which is based on discrete choice theory3. This mechanism
assumes that agents evaluate the two forecasting rules by computing their past prof-
itability and to increase (reduce) the weight of one rule if it is more (less) proﬁtable
than the alternative rule. We specify this procedure as follows:
3This speciﬁcation is often applied in discrete choice models. For an application in the markets for
diﬀerentiated goods, see Anderson, et al., (1992). There are other ways to specify a rule that governs
the selection of forecasting strategies. One was proposed by Kirman(1993). Another one was formulated








































where µ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and π
f
t and πc
t are the proﬁts made in forecast-
ing, while σ2
f,t and σ2
c,t are the variances of the forecast errors made using fundamentalist
and chartist rules, respectively.




as the one-period returns of investing in the foreign asset:
πi











0 for x =0
−1 for x<0
and i = c, f
Thus, when agents forecasted an increase in the exchange rate return (the return of
the foreign currency) and this increase is realized, their proﬁt is equal to the observed
increase in the exchange rate return. If instead the exchange rate return declines, they
make a loss which equals this decline (because in this case they have bought foreign
assets which have declined in return).
Equations (13) and (14) can now be interpreted as follows. When the risk adjusted
proﬁts of the extrapolative (chartist) rule increase, relative to the risk adjusted proﬁts
of the mean-reverting (fundamentalist) rule, then the weight the agents give to the
extrapolative rule in period t increases, and vice versa. The parameter δ measures the
intensity with which the agents switch the weights from one rule to the other. With
7an increasing δ agents react strongly to the relative proﬁtability of the two forecasting
rules. In the limit, when δ goes to inﬁnity, the agents choose the forecasting rule which
proves to be more proﬁtable. When δ is equal to zero, agents are insensitive to the
relative proﬁtability of these rules. In the latter case, the weights of mean-reverting and
extrapolative rules are constant and equal to 0.5.T h u s ,δ is a measure of inertia in the
decision to give more weight to the more proﬁtable rule4.
The weights obtained from equations (13) and (14) are then substituted into the
rate equation(12) :





















t (st+1)=st−1 + β∆st−1 (20)
Note that in this learning mechanism agents are assumed to use the same values of
parameters β and ψ in every period t. However, they give diﬀerent weights to these
parameters each period, depending on how well the forecasting rules underlying these
parameters do in terms of proﬁtability.
3.2 Statistical learning
The second learning mechanism that we consider here is statistical learning (see Evans
and Honkapoja (2001)). As before, agents’ expectations are composed of two compo-
nents, i.e. a mean-reverting and an extrapolative one. Agents are assumed to have
some basic knowledge of econometrics and they estimate the importance of these two












4The logic of the switching weight is the same spirit of the adaptive rules that are used in game
theoretic models (See, for examples, Cheung and Friedman (1997); Fudenberg and Levine, (1998)). In
these models, actions that did better in the observed past tend to increase in frequency while actions
that did worse tend to decrease in frequency.
8At time t +1 , as the realized values of the market (st) and fundamental (s∗
t) exchange
rates are available, agents revise their forecasting rule. In particular, according to their
forecasting rule, they regress ∆st on s∗
t−1−st−1 and ∆st−1. They update the parameters
ψt−1 and βt−1 using recursive methods5 and the last available information, i.e. st :












where φt =( ψt,βt)
0
is the vector of parameter estimates, zt−1 =( s∗
t−1 − st−1,∆st−1)





i−1 is a moment matrix and γt is
the gain. The gain captures the speed of updating in the sense of how much weight
the agents put on the new incoming information. We will assume that agents put more
weight on new information and thus update their forecasts with a low constant gain.
Introducing the perceived law of motion (PLM) as given by equation (21) into equation
(2), we obtain the resulting actual law of motion (ALM) of the market exchange rate:
st =( 1− α)s∗
t + α(1 + βt−1 − ψt−1)st−1 − αβt−1st−2 + αψt−1s∗
t−1 + ηt (23)
4 Steady state properties
In this section, we analyze the steady state properties of the market exchange rate under
two learning mechanisms. This will allow us to analyze the question of whether these
two learning mechanisms are capable of revealing the fundamental value of the exchange
rate in the steady state.
4.1 The steady state under ﬁtness learning
In order to analyze the steady state of the model under ﬁtness mechanism, we strip
it from its stochastic components. Thus we assume that the fundamental variable is
5 Note that ψt−1should now be interpreted as time varying expression ω
fψ used in the previous




9constant. In addition, for the sake of convenience, we set the fundamental rate, s∗
t =
s∗ =0 . As a result, the exchange rate movements can be interpreted as deviations from
their fundamental value.














































t−2 (st−1) − st−1
i2
(27)
Using the deﬁnition of the forecasting rules (8) and (10) this yields
σ2
c,t−1 =[ −βst−3 +( 1+β)st−2 − st−1]
2 (28)
σ2
f,t−1 =[ ( 1− ψ)st−2 − st−1]
2 (29)
With suitable changes of variables it is possible to write these equations as a 3-
dimensional system. Set:
ut = st−1
xt = ut−1(= st−2)
The 3 dynamic variables are (st,u t,x t). The state of the system at time t − 1,i . e .
(st−1,u t−1,x t−1) determines the state of the system at time t,i . e . (st,u t,x t) through
the following 3-D dynamical system:
st = α[(1 − ω
f
t−1)((ψ + β)ut − βxt)] (30)
10ut = st−1 (31)
xt = ut−1 (32)
where ω
f
t−1 is deﬁned in equation (25) and the forecast errors and ex-post proﬁts
are deﬁn e di nf o l l o w i n gw a y :
σ2
c,t−1 =[ ( 1+β)ut−1 − βxt−1 − st−1]
2 (33)
σ2
f,t−1 =[ ( 1− ψ)ut−1 − st−1]
2 (34)
πc
t−1 =( st−1 − ut−1) sgn [β(ut−1 − xt−1)] (35)
π
f
t−1 =( st−1 − ut−1) sgn [−ψut−1]
We can now analyze the nature of the steady state solution. Since we have normal-
ized the fundamental exchange rate s∗
t to be zero, the fundamental solution implies that
st =0 . As a result, the variance terms go to zero.
The steady state of the system is now obtained by setting:
(st−1,u t−1,x t−1)=( st,u t,x t)=( s,u,x)
in the dynamical system (30)-(32).
T h e r ei sau n i q u es t e a d ys t a t ew h e r e
s,u,x =0
Notice also that at the steady state:






,πf = πc =0 ,σ2
f = σ2
c =0 (36)
i.e. the steady state is characterized by the exchange rate being at its fundamental
level, by zero proﬁts and zero risk, and by fundamentalist and technical trader fractions
equal to 1
2.
11We can also analyze the conditions under which a non-zero steady state solution
exists. This is a solution in which the exchange rate is constant and permanently diﬀerent
from its (constant) fundamental value. If such a second steady state solution exists, the
model allows for an exchange rate in the steady state that is permanently disconnected
from its fundamental.
In order to analyze under what condition such a steady state solution can arise, we
use equation (2) and set st = st−1 = st−2 = s, so that
s = α(1 − ω
f
t ψ)s (37)
It can now easily be seen that a solution of the type s 6=0exists iﬀ α(1 − ω
f
t ψ)=
1. This condition is satisﬁed if α =1and ω
f
t =0 . The ﬁrst of these two conditions says
that the current fundamental should have no inﬂuence on the current exchange rate;
the second condition says that the share of the fundamentalists in the market should
be zero. The latter, however, can only arise if σ2
f,t →∞ (This can be seen from the
deﬁnition of ω
f
t in (25)). As a result, a solution whereby the market exchange rate
permanently deviates from the market exchange rate can be ruled out.
We conclude that in the steady state, the exchange rate equals its fundamental value
and the learning based on the ﬁtness method reveals the fundamental value.
4.2 The steady state under statistical learning
In this subsection, we analyze the properties of the steady state of the model under
statistical learning. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the agents learn using
decreasing gain i.e., simple Least Squares updating. The agents’ PLM is of the following
form:





+ βt−1∆st−1 + ςt+1 (38)











where they forecast the market exchange rate return ˜ ∆st+1. We can write equation
(38):






Substituting the PLM into equation (2), yields the resulting ALM of the market ex-
change rate:
st =( 1− α)s∗
t + α(1 + β − ψ)st−1 − αβst−2 + αψs∗
t−1 + ηt (41)
Using the ALM for st−1 and the deﬁnition of the fundamental rate s∗
t in equation (3),
we obtain the following speciﬁcation of the market exchange rate:
st =[ ( 1− α)+αψ + α(1 + β − ψ)(1− α)]s∗
t−2+
£
α2(1 + β − ψ) − αβ
¤
st−2 + α2β(1 + β − ψ)(st−2 − st−3)+ (42)





+[ ( 1− α)+αψ + α(1 + β − ψ)(1− α)] t−1+
(1 − α) t +[ α(1 + β − ψ)(1− α)]ηt−1 + ηt
After substraction st−2 from both sides and carrying out some manipulations, we
can rewrite the ALM in the same form as the PLM (equation (21)):
st − st−2 =( αψ − α +1 )( α + αβ − αψ +1 )( s∗
t−2 − st−2)+
α2(1 + β − ψ)β(st−2 − st−3)+[ ( 1− α)+αψ + α(1 + β − ψ)(1− α)] t−1+
(43)
(1 − α) t +[ α(1 + β − ψ)(1− α)]ηt−1 + ηt








(αψ − α +1 )( α + αβ − αψ +1 )
α2(1 + β − ψ)β
¶
(44)
From the system(44), we can compute the stationary points of T(ψ,β)
0
. From the second
equation of this system, we obtain two solutions for β i.e., β1 =0or β2 = −1+ψ + 1
α2.
We calculate the resulting solutions for ψ, for each of the ﬁxed points of β. When
β1 =0 , we have two possible solutions for ψ1 =1or ψ2 =1− 1
α2. For β2 = −1+ψ+ 1
α2,
we ﬁnd ψ3 =1− 1
α2. Substituting this result in β2, this yields β2 =0 . As a result,






and means that the agents learn that the extrapolating component does
not play a role in determination of the market exchange rate (β1 =0 ) .T h e y ﬁnd
13that the market exchange rate will return to the fundamental rate in the next period
(ψ1 =1 ). Substituting these values into the ALM (41), we obtain :
st = s∗
t + ηt − α t (45)
Thus, we ﬁnd that this set of ﬁxed points leads to the near rational expectations solution
of the model6.E q u a t i o n(45) includes an additional element with respect to the REE
described by equation (6),n a m e l yα t. The existence of this noise term in the equilibrium
exchange rate process is due to the diﬀerent assumptions about the information set
the agents use. Rational agents are assumed to know the fundamental value of the
exchange rate s∗
t at t, while the agents who use statistical methods do not have s∗
t
in their information set at t. As a result, these agents face an additional uncertainty
about the exchange rate, reﬂected by α t. In the steady state, assuming for the sake of
simplicity, s∗
t = s∗
t−1 =¯ s∗ =0and ηt =  t =0 ,w eﬁnd st =0 . This means that in
the steady state the adaptive learning model leads the exchange rate to its fundamental






indicates that the agents again learn that extrapolating parameter to be zero (β2 =0 )
and a negative value of ψ2. This means that the fundamentalists learn to extrapolate the
diﬀerence between market and fundamental exchange rates. We substitute the values
of the second solution i.e., ψ2 =1− 1
α2 and β2 =0into the ALM (41). We ﬁnd that the
current market exchange rate is a sum of the fundamental rate and the extrapolated









− αvt + ηt (46)
If we again assume that in the steady state s∗
t = s∗
t−1 =¯ s∗ =0and  t,ηt =0 , we ﬁnd
that st =0 . We conclude that the only existing equilibrium is the one when the market
exchange rate equals the fundamental rate. The two solutions however imply diﬀerent
short run dynamics. The ﬁrst set of ﬁxed points φ1, leading to near rational expectations
solution implies that the market rate is permanently connected to the fundamental rate.
The second solution φ2, allows for some short run disconnection from the fundamental
6We call the solution near rational expectations when it depends on the same state variables that
REE and diﬀers from it only in iid error term.
14rate. We study the short dynamics of the market rate within the proposed model in the
following section.
We checked the expectational stability (E-stability) of the two possible solutions























yields the eigenvalues at the border of E-stability/unstability, and
thus the analysis requires higher order approximation and the use of center manifold
techniques. This analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Dynamic analysis
From the previous analysis it follows that both learning models allow the exchange rate
to converge to its fundamental value. Thus, both learning mechanisms are eﬃcient
in revealing the fundamental value of the exchange rate in the steady state. These
steady state properties, however, do not guarantee the same dynamic properties. As a
result, these two learning mechanisms could produce very diﬀerent short-term behavior
of the exchange rate. The non-linear properties of the model make it very diﬃcult
to describe its dynamics with analytical tools. We therefore use numerical methods to
analyse the dynamic properties of the model. We study these properties within two
diﬀerent cases. In the ﬁrst case, we assume the values of the parameters to be such
that they correspond to low frequency (quarterly) observations. In the second case,
we assume them to correspond to high frequency (daily) observations. In these two
cases, the discount factor α is calculated based on the assumption that the nominal
interest rate r =5 %per year. We also calibrate the size of shocks. We assume that the
news in fundamentals,  t, and in the noise in the foreign exchange market , ηt,a r eo f
the same magnitude (their standard deviations are equal). The values of the standard
deviations of these shocks are calculated on the basis of a simple fundamental model of
the exchange rate which is studied in more detail in Section 7.
155.1 Low frequency observations
We show the contrast in the dynamics produced by the two learning mechanisms by
simulating the model in the time domain over 10000 periods with a quarterly discount








. The standard deviations of the fundamental
shock and the market noise are equal σ  = ση and set to 0.03. This number is ob-
tained from the rescaled monthly standard deviation of the fundamental shock, found
in the data and equal to 0.015 (see section 7). We calculate the quarterly equivalent by
multiplying this number by
√
4.I nt h eﬁtness learning model, we set the value of the
parameter β at 0.95 and ψ at 0.25. This choice may seem arbitrary but it is consistent
with empirical evidence suggesting that, in the short run, agents expect the past change
to be almost entirely extrapolated into the future, while they believe that, in the longer
run, the market rate will return to the fundamental value7. The value of ψ =0 .25 for
quarterly observations suggests that the agents expect the market rate to return to the
fundamental value in one year8.
In the statistical learning model, we assume that the agents learn the underlying
process of the market exchange rate using a constant gain γ. This assumption implies
that traders put a higher weight on the more recent data. However, under the constant
gain learning, the estimated coeﬃcients do not converge to a single point, as suggested
by the steady state analysis from the previous section, but to a distribution centered
around the estimates9. As a result, we expect that the estimated coeﬃcients will be more
volatile, with the means corresponding to the solutions φ1. As a benchmark constant
gain, we use the value estimated by F. Milani (2005), who estimated a constant gain
used by the agents forming expectations about inﬂation. He found that agents make
use of 13-14 years of data (γ =0 .0183). In Section 7, we set a higher value of the gain,
7For the detailed description of the traders’ forecasts see Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Cheung et
al. (2004).
8The empirical evidence suggests that the convergence of market rate to the fundamental rate may
take longer than one year. Frankel and Froot (1987) ﬁnd an expected half-life for deviations from the
fundamental proxied by PPP of around 3 years. Similarly, Mark (1995) and Chinn and Meese (1995)
demonstrate that the models incorporating a set of fundamentals have some statistically signiﬁcant
power over the horizon of 3 years. These results are not inconsistent with traders’ expectations. In
fact, traders use both rules, i.e. fundamentalists and chartists forecasting rules, simaultaneously. The
extrapolative behaviour of agents prevents the market rate from reaching its fundamental value over
the horizon implied by the fundamentalists rule (Cheung et al. (2001)).
9See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for the necessary conditions for the converegence of the constant
gain algorithms.
16thus assuming faster learning.
 
Figure 1: Exchange rate at low frequency under ﬁtness learning and weight
on chartists’ rule
We present the results of ﬁtness learning in Figure 1. The upper panel shows the
market and the fundamental exchange rates in the time domain for a subsample of
500 periods. We ﬁnd that the market exchange rate is often disconnected from the
fundamental one. As can be seen in Figure 1, the market exchange rate moves around
the fundamental in a cyclical way. These cyclical movements have the appearance of
bubbles and crashes. A comparison of the upper and lower parts of the left panel of
Figure 1 allows us to understand the nature of these cycical movements. The lower part
s h o w st h ew e i g h t so nt h ec h a r t i s t s ’r u l e .W eﬁnd that periods of sustained deviations
of the exchange rate from the fundamental coincide with periods during which the
chartists’ rule dominates the market expectations. We have analyzed this feature in the
framework of a similar model in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005 and 2006).
Our interpretation of this result is that a series of stochastic shocks in one direc-
tion can lead to an increased proﬁtability of the extrapolative (chartist) forecasting rule
17thereby leading to an increased popularity of this rule at the expense of the funda-
mentalist rule. This creates a self-fulﬁlling dynamics. As chartist rules become more
proﬁtable they get more weight in the market forecast, thereby intensifying the up-
ward (downward) movement. At some point, however, movements in the fundamental
have the eﬀect of pulling the exchange rate back to its fundamental. We will return to
this feature later and apply a sensitivity analysis to check under what conditions this
dynamics occurs.
 
Figure 2: Exchange rate at low frequency under statistical learning and esti-
mated parameters
The results of statistical learning, shown in Figure 2, lead to a diﬀerent conclusion.
The diﬀerence between market and fundamental rates is very small. The mean diﬀerence
is equal to −0.0012 in the sample shown in Figure 2. Thus, there does not seem to be
disconnection as the exchange rate closely follows the fundamental rate. The lower panel
of Figure 2 shows the parameters ψ and β estimated by the agents. As expected, they
are very volatile and they ﬂuctuate around 1 and 0. Thus, the agents learn the values of
parameters ψ and β distributed around the means leading to the fundamental exchange
rate (see equation (45)). As a result, the market exchange rate is connected to the
fundamental rate.
185.2 High frequency observations
In this subsection, we analyze the model in an environment of high frequency observa-




=0 .999 and the size of
shocks: σv = ση = 0.015 √
21 =0 .0033.
Figure 3: Exchange rate at high frequency under ﬁtness learning and weight
of chartists’ rule
In the ﬁtness learning model we now set the parameter ψ =0 .004 which is consistent
with the assumption used earlier that the agents expect the market rate to converge
to the fundamental rate in one year. We show an example of a simulation in the
time domain in Figure 3. Note that we show the results of more periods than in the
previous section, since they now correspond to a much shorter time span. The results
are similar to those reported in the previous subsection. The market exchange rate is
often disconnected from the underlying fundamental.
For the statistical learning model, we assume again that agents use 13 − 14 years
of data implying γ =0 .0003 for daily data. We calculated this number assuming 250
trading days in a year: γ = 1
3250.
An example of a simulation with statistical learning is shown in Figure 4. The upper
panel shows simulated market and fundamental rates and the lower panel presents the
corresponding values of the parameters ψ and β. Unlike the low frequency case, we ﬁnd
here that the market exchange rate can be disconnected from the fundamental value.
Although the mean diﬀerence during the whole simulated sample is low, i.e. −0.0245,
19Figure 4: Exchange rate at high frequency under statistical learning and
estimated parameters
w es e ei nF i g u r e5t h a tt h i sd i ﬀerence can even reach the numbers of the order of 0.2.
The disconnection phenomenon is observed in the initial phase of the simulation period,
however. After some time it tends to disappear as is made clear in Figure 5.
The disconnection between market and fundamental rates occurs because the agents
are slow to learn the steady state values of the parameters ψ and β distributed around
1 and 0, respectively. Thus statistical learning produces the disconnection phenomenon
when applied to high frequency data, in particular, when the discount factor comes
close to one (here α =0 .999). As we saw in Section 2, the REE is stationary, only when
α<1.T h u sav a l u eo fα =1constitutes the border between stability and instability
of the fundamental REE. When, in the stochastic environment, α gets closer to this
border, agents are very slow to learn about the fundamental and the exchange rate
can be attracted by unstable solutions. The intuition of this result is that in a high
frequency environment, the attempt to update the estimated coeﬃcients on a daily basis
is likely to run into diﬃculties. The signal to noise ratio is very low. As a result, the
agents need a great amount of data to ﬁnd out that the fundamental inﬂuences the
20Figure 5: The diﬀerence between market and fundamental exchange rates
market exchange rate. This can also be seen in the lower panel of Figure 4. In the
beginning of the learning process, when the agents do not have a lot of observations,
both parameters are very close to zero. As a result, the market rate is disconnected from
the fundamental rate. When more data become available, agents ﬁnd the parameters ψ
and β to be diﬀerent from zero. In particular, we observe that the parameter ψ tends
to increase. As a result, the diﬀerence between market and fundamental rates declines
and the disconnection tends to disappear.
6 Sensitivity analysis
In the previous section, we found that both, ﬁtness and statistical learning models
can generate a market exchange rate disconnected from the fundamental rate. Fit-
ness learning however can produce this disconnection in the high as well as in the low
frequency cases, while under statistical learning the disconnection occurs only in the
high frequency case when agents have not yet collected suﬃc i e n td a t at oe s t i m a t et h e
underlying parameters accurately. In this section, we analyze these characteristics in
more detail by checking how sensitive these results are to diﬀerent parameter values. In
particular, we check under what conditions this disconnection emerges.
216.1 Sensitivity to β of the ﬁtness learning model
In order to better understand the cyclical nature of the short-term dynamics in the
ﬁtness learning, we performed a sensitivity analysis whereby we allowed the parameter
β and the initial conditions to change. We simulated the model assuming that the
stochastic realization of the fundamental was identical for all the diﬀerent values of the
parameter β and for all initial conditions. We then simulated the model for diﬀerent
time lengths going from T =5 0to T = 1000 and we collected the deviation of the
exchange rate from its fundamental in period T. We show the results in Figure 6. On
 
 
Figure 6: Diﬀerence between market and fundamental rates as a function of
initial conditions and beta under ﬁtness learning
the vertical axis we set out the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental
after 50,200,500and 1000 periods respectively. On the x-axis we show the diﬀerent
values of the parameter β, and on the y-axis the diﬀerent initial conditions. We ﬁnd
ﬁrst that when the model is simulated over short periods of time, the exchange rate can
deviate signiﬁcantly from its fundamental. When for example the model is simulated
for T =5 0 , the exchange rate in period T deviates from its fundamental when initial
shocks are suﬃciently large and when β increases. Thus, it appears that when the
initial shock is large enough and when β is large enough, the exchange rate remains
22disconnected from its fundamental value even after 50 periods. As the simulation period
is extended, the area of disconnections shrinks. When T exceeds 1000, the exchange
rate has returned to its fundamental value for almost all initial conditions and for all
values of β. This result is consistent with our steady state analysis which showed that
in the steady state the exchange rate is equal to its fundamental. However, given that it
takes a relatively long period for the exchange rate to return to its fundamental value,
in a stochastic environment, the exchange rate will often be attracted by temporary
equilibria that deviate from the fundamental. This will then lead to relatively long
episodes of disconnection. These phenomena become more pronounced when the size
of the stochastic shocks increases and when the chartists’ extrapolation parameter β
increases. It is also for these values that we obtain the bubble and crash scenarios
illustrated in the previous section.
6.2 The role of the discount factor in both models
Since the disconnection under statistical learning occurs in the high frequency case, it
appears that the key parameter in the model is the discount factor α. Therefore, we
analyze the sensitivity of the results of the diﬀerent models with respect to the discount
factor.
As before, we simulated the model assuming that the stochastic realizations of the
fundamental was identical for all the diﬀerent values of the discount factor α and for all
initial conditions. We varied the values of the discount factor α between 0.995 and 1.
We ﬁrst show the results for the ﬁtness learning model in Figure 7. As in the previous
section we show results for diﬀerent simulation periods, i.e. T = 100,T = 200 and
T = 1000. On the vertical axis we set out the deviation of the exchange rate from its
fundamental. On the x-axis we show the diﬀerent values of the discount factor α,a n do n
the y-axis the diﬀerent initial conditions. We ﬁnd ﬁrst that when the model is simulated
over short periods of time (T = 100), the exchange rate can deviate signiﬁcantly from
its fundamental. Thus, it appears that when the initial shock is large enough and when
α is large enough (high frequency), the exchange rate remains disconnected from its
fundamental value. We observe that the exchange rate can get caught in a (temporary)
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Figure 7: Diﬀerence between market and fundamental rates as a function of
discount factor under ﬁtness learning
non-fundamental equilibrium. When we allow the simulation period to increase we
observe that the ”zone of disconnection” shrinks. When T is large enough only values
of α close enough to 1 will produce an exchange rate that is disconnected from the
fundamental.
We performed a similar sensitivity analysis for the statistical learning model. The
results are presented in Figure 8. We ﬁnd that when the simulation period is short
(T =1 0 0 )the exchange rate deviates from its fundamental and this deviation increases
with α. As the simulation period is increased one needs larger α0s for the exchange
rate to deviate from its fundamental. When T = 1000 t h ee x c h a n g er a t ec o n v e r g e s
to its fundamental for all but the values of α very close to 1. Thus, as agents have
more observations to learn the true parameters, the exchange rate will be pulled to its
fundamental.
Thus, the results obtained for the ﬁtness and statistical learning models are similar.
T h e r ea r e ,s o m ed i ﬀerences though. First, the deviations from the fundamental take
much larger proportions in the ﬁtness learning than in the statistical learning model.
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Figure 8: Diﬀerence between market and fundamental rates as a function of
discount factor under statistical learning
Second, in the ﬁtness learning model there is a clear discontinuity that separates the
space of fundamental equilibria from the space of (temporary) nonfundamental equi-
libria. This explains why in the ﬁtness model a relatively small shock in the initial
condition can bring the exchange rate into a non-fundamental (bubble) equilibrium. In
the statistical learning model, the transition between fundamental and non-fundamental
equilibria is smooth, so that one needs a relatively large shock in initial conditions to
drive the exchange rate away from its fundamental.
7 Descriptive statistics
In this section, we analyze the variability characteristics of the market exchange rate
produced by the model under two diﬀerent learning mechanisms. For this purpose, we
use monthly market rates of the German Mark, Japanese Yen and UK Pound, during the
period between the sixth month of 1982 and the twelfth month of 1998. These market
rates are expressed as units of these currencies per US dollar and they are provided by
the IMF in the International Financial Statistics. The monthly fundamental rates are
25constructed on the basis of the monetary model:
s∗
t =( mt − m∗
t) − φ(yt − y∗
t) (47)
where s∗
t denotes the log fundamental rate expressed as units of national currency per
US dollar, mt, m∗
t and yt,y ∗
t are money supplies and real incomes in the home and
foreign countries, respectively. The income elasticity of money demand φ is assumed
to be 1. The money supply is proxied by seasonally adjusted M2 aggregates coming
from OECD Main Economic Indicators Database. For the real income data, we use







which corresponds to monthly frequencies and γ =0 .003
(which as before assumes that agents use data extending over 14 years). Table 1 shows
Table 1: Volatility in the exchange rate market
Market volatility Fundamental volatility Excess Volatility
DM 0.027 0.015 0.012
JY 0.030 0.014 0.016
UKP 0.027 0.013 0.014
Statistical
Learning 0.015 0.015 0
Fitness
Learning 0.021 0.015 0.006
Return volatility is measured by a sample standard deviation of the
returns. DM denotes the German Mark, JY the Japanese Yen and UKP
the UK Pound. The excess volatility is calculated as a diﬀerence between
the market return volatility and the fundamental return volatility.
the unconditional volatility of the market and fundamental rates for three currencies and
of the simulated series of the market exchange rate under ﬁtness and statistical learning.
The unconditional volatility is measured as a sample standard deviation of the returns.
In the simulations we set the standard deviation of the fundamental rate equal to 0.015
(remember that the fundamental rate follows a random walk eq.(3)), which is a number
corresponding to the standard deviation found in the data (see the ﬁrst three columns
of Table 1). We notice that the statistical learning model does not generate excess
volatility. In contrast, the ﬁtness learning mechanism produces exchange rate returns
more volatile than the fundamental returns.
267.1 Excess volatility with fast statistical learning
The previous results of the statistical learning model assumed γ =0 .003.T h i s v a l u e
implies a relatively slow learning process in that agents collect a long series of data
points. We experimented with higher value of γ =0 .015 (implying a faster learning)
still assuming high frequency i.e. α =0 .996. We found two possible cases. First, as
already observed in Section 5, we ﬁnd that the market exchange rate can be disconnected
from the fundamental rate when the parameters ψ and β do not converge to the steady
state values. Furthermore, a higher gain produces an excess volatility of 0.01 which
is a number close to the one observed in reality. The excess volatility generated in
an environment where the agents update the parameters of the model using statistical
methods has also been found by Kim and Mark (2005). Second, a higher gain can also
lead to instability of the model.
We illustrate this in Figure 9. The upper part of the ﬁgure shows the exchange rate
in the time domain. It can be seen that the exchange rate is sometimes gripped by
episodes of large turbulence. The underlying reason is that agents learn too high a
value of the extrapolative parameter β (which tends to converge to 1) and too low a
value of the mean-revering parameter ψ (see the second and third panels of Figure 9 ).
Thus, the combination of high frequency observations and relatively fast learning can
create high turbulence. This is also a case when the volatility of the market exchange
rate is extremely high. The excess volatility of the exchange rate showed in Figure 9
is equal to 5.9, a number that largely exceeds the empirically observed excess volatility
(see Table 1).
The lower panel in Figure 9 shows the phase diagram corresponding to the simu-
lations of the exchange rate (top panel). It describes the movements of the exchange
rate (the attractor) in the st,s t−1 − space.W e o b t a i nav e r yc o m p l e xa t t a c t o rw h i c h
is responsible for the high volatility.
When we allow γ to increase beyond 0.02 the models leads to explosive solutions.
Thus, a combination of high discount factor α and high constant gain γ leads to in-
stability. We conclude that fast statistical learning can generate excess volatility close
to the one observed in the data. However, it can also produce volatility that largely
27 
 
Figure 9: Cyclical solution under statistical learning
28exceeds the empirically observed volatility. It can even lead to explosive solutions.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we investigated the behavior of the exchange rate within the framework
of a standard asset pricing model. We introduced into this model boundedly rational
agents who use simple rules to forecast the future exchange rate. We assumed that
agents test these rules continuously. This testing procedure is the mechanism by which
discipline is imposed on the behavior of individual agents. We speciﬁed two alternative
testing procedures (learning mechanisms). In the ﬁrst one, agents select the rules based
on a ﬁtness method. This mechanism assumes that agents evaluate the two forecasting
rules by computing their past proﬁtability and to increase (reduce) the weight of one
rule if it is more (less) proﬁtable than the alternative rule. In the second mechanism,
agents learn to improve these rules using statistical methods. They are assumed to have
some basic knowledge of econometrics, such that they estimate the parameters of the
rules they use.
We investigated which of these learning rules generates more realistic dynamics of
the exchange rate. In particular, we focused on two regularities observed in the foreign
exchange markets, namely the disconnect puzzle and the excess volatility phenomenon.
For this purpose, we carried out a number of analytical and numerical exercises. Our
results can be summarized as follows.
First, we found that both learning mechanisms are eﬃcient in revealing the funda-
mental value of the exchange rate in the steady state.
Second, both mechanisms can generate the disconnection of the market rate from the
fundamental value and the excess volatility of the market returns with respect to funda-
mental returns. The ﬁtness learning model produces the disconnect phenomenon of the
exchange rate when it is applied to low and high frequencies of the observations. The
disconnection produced by the model are large and persistent, indicating the presence
of bubbles and crashes. As the sensitivity analysis demonstrated, these disconnections
are mainly triggered by extrapolative forces of the chartist forecasting rule.
The statistical learning model does not reproduce the disconnection phenomenon
when it is applied to low frequency observations. The model does generate disconnections
29when applied in an environment of high frequency observations. This disconnection
arises because, at high frequencies, the signal to noise ratio is very low. A lack of
data makes the agents unable to ﬁnd the steady state values of the model parameters.
When we simulate the model over suﬃciently long periods, agents accumulate more data
and are capable of learning the true parameter values of the underlying model. The
disconnection then tends to disappear. Thus under learning the disconnect phenomenon
should be considered as a temporary phenomenon.
Finally, we analyzed in detail the variability characteristics of the market exchange
rate produced by the model under the two diﬀerent learning mechanisms, and we com-
pared these with those observed in the data. Fitness learning generates excess volatility
which however remains smaller than the one observed in the data. Statistical learning,
however, only generates excess volatility with a narrow set of values for the discount
factor and the constant gain.
More research needs to be done to test the validity of these two learning methods.
In particular we intend to analyze other statistical properties of the exchange rate
movements generated by the two models (e.g. volatility clustering and excess kurtosis)
and to confront these to the observed movements of the exchange rate. This will allow
us to evaluate the two modelling approaches with more conﬁdence.
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33Appendix A
Table 2: Parameters values in time domain simulations
Simulations/Figures
Parameters Fig 1 Fig 2 Fig 3 Fig 4 Fig 5
α 0.988 0.988 0.999 0.999 0.999
ψ 0.25 0.004
β 0.95 0.95
ση 0.03 0.03 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033
σ  0.03 0.03 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033
δ 10 10
µ 1 1
γ 0.02 0.0003 0.0003
T 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
34Table 3: Parameters values in sensitivity analysis
Simulations/Figures/Tables
Parameters Fig 6 Fig 7 Fig 8 Table 1 Fig 9
Stat Fit
α 0.999 0.995 − 1 0.99 − 1 0.996 0.996 0.996
ψ 0.2 0.2 0.01
β 0.5 − 1 0.95 0.95
ση 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.015 0.015 0.015
σ  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.015 0.015 0.015
δ 5 5 10
µ 1 1 1
γ 0.003 0.003 0.015
ψ0 0 0 0
β0 0 0 0
s0 (−10)−(+10) (−10)−(+10) (−10)−(+10) 0 0 0
ωf 0.5 0.5 0.5
ωc 0.5 0.5 0.5
T 50 − 1000 100 − 1000 100 200 200 1000
Stat corresponds to statistical learning procedure and Fit to the ﬁtness
learning method.
35CESifo Working Paper Series 




1653 Axel Dreher and Friedrich Schneider, Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An 
Empirical Analysis, January 2006 
 
1654 Stefan Brandauer and Florian Englmaier, A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests 
between Groups, January 2006 
 
1655 Jan Zápal and Ondřej Schneider, What are their Words Worth? Political Plans and 
Economic Pains of Fiscal Consolidations in New EU Member States, January 2006 
 
1656 Thiess Buettner, Sebastian Hauptmeier and Robert Schwager, Efficient Revenue 
Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany, January 
2006 
 
1657 Daniel Haile, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Harrie A. A. Verbon, Cross-Racial Envy and 
Underinvestment in South Africa, February 2006 
 
1658 Frode Meland and Odd Rune Straume, Outsourcing in Contests, February 2006 
 
1659 M. Hashem Pesaran and Ron Smith, Macroeconometric Modelling with a Global 
Perspective, February 2006 
 
1660 Alexander F. Wagner and Friedrich Schneider, Satisfaction with Democracy and the 
Environment in Western Europe – a Panel Analysis, February 2006 
 
1661 Ben J. Heijdra and Jenny E. Ligthart, Fiscal Policy, Monopolistic Competition, and 
Finite Lives, February 2006 
 
1662 Ludger Woessmann, Public-Private Partnership and Schooling Outcomes across 
Countries, February 2006 
 
1663 Topi Miettinen and Panu Poutvaara, Political Parties and Network Formation, February 
2006 
 
1664 Alessandro Cigno and Annalisa Luporini, Optimal Policy Towards Families with 
Different Amounts of Social Capital, in the Presence of Asymmetric Information and 
Stochastic Fertility, February 2006 
 
1665 Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter, Regional Effects on Employer Provided 
Training: Evidence from Apprenticeship Training in Switzerland, February 2006 
 
1666 Laszlo Goerke, Bureaucratic Corruption and Profit Tax Evasion, February 2006 
 
1667 Ivo J. M. Arnold and Jan J. G. Lemmen, Inflation Expectations and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the Eurozone: Evidence from Survey Data, February 2006 
  
1668 Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller, Voice and Bargaining Power, February 2006 
 
1669 Françoise Forges and Frédéric Koessler, Long Persuasion Games, February 2006 
 
1670 Florian Englmaier and Markus Reisinger, Information, Coordination, and the 
Industrialization of Countries, February 2006 
 
1671 Hendrik Hakenes and Andreas Irmen, Something out of Nothing? Neoclassical Growth 
and the ‘Trivial’ Steady State, February 2006 
 
1672 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Democracy and Development: The Devil in the 
Details, February 2006 
 
1673 Michael Rauber and Heinrich W. Ursprung, Evaluation of Researchers: A Life Cycle 
Analysis of German Academic Economists, February 2006 
 
1674 Ernesto Reuben and Frans van Winden, Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators 
Know each other, February 2006 
 
1675 Assar Lindbeck and Mats Persson, A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms, 
February 2006 
 
1676 Horst Raff, Michael Ryan and Frank Staehler, Asset Ownership and Foreign-Market 
Entry, February 2006 
 
1677 Miguel Portela, Rob Alessie and Coen Teulings, Measurement Error in Education and 
Growth Regressions, February 2006 
 
1678 Andreas Haufler, Alexander Klemm and Guttorm Schjelderup, Globalisation and the 
Mix of Wage and Profit Taxes, February 2006 
 
1679 Kurt R. Brekke and Lars Sørgard, Public versus Private Health Care in a National 
Health Service, March 2006 
 
1680 Dominik Grafenhofer, Christian Jaag, Christian Keuschnigg and Mirela Keuschnigg, 
Probabilistic Aging, March 2006 
 
1681 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Persistence of Innovation in Dutch Manufacturing: Is it Spurious?, March 2006 
 
1682 Andrea Colciago, V. Anton Muscatelli, Tiziano Ropele and Patrizio Tirelli, The Role of 
Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: Are National Automatic Stabilizers Effective?, 
March 2006 
 
1683 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Risk Selection in Natural Disaster 
Insurance – the Case of France, March 2006 
 
1684 Ken Sennewald and Klaus Waelde, “Itô’s Lemma“ and the Bellman Equation for 
Poisson Processes: An Applied View, March 2006 
  
1685 Ernesto Reuben and Frans van Winden, Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of 
Emotions and Fairness Norms, March 2006 
 
1686 Françoise Forges, The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies 
with and without Indivisibilities, March 2006 
 
1687 Assar Lindbeck, Mårten Palme and Mats Persson, Job Security and Work Absence: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, March 2006 
 
1688 Sebastian Buhai and Coen Teulings, Tenure Profiles and Efficient Separation in a 
Stochastic Productivity Model, March 2006 
 
1689 Gebhard Kirchgaessner and Silika Prohl, Sustainability of Swiss Fiscal Policy, March 
2006 
 
1690 A. Lans Bovenberg and Peter Birch Sørensen, Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance in 
a Lifetime Perspective, March 2006 
 
1691 Moritz Schularick and Thomas M. Steger, Does Financial Integration Spur Economic 
Growth? New Evidence from the First Era of Financial Globalization, March 2006 
 
1692 Burkhard Heer and Alfred Maussner, Business Cycle Dynamics of a New Keynesian 
Overlapping Generations Model with Progressive Income Taxation, March 2006 
 
1693 Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen, Meta-Analysis of the Business Cycle Correlation 
between the Euro Area and the CEECs, March 2006 
 
1694 Steffen Henzel and Timo Wollmershaeuser, The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and the 
Role of Expectations: Evidence from the Ifo World Economic Survey, March 2006 
 
1695 Yin-Wong Cheung, An Empirical Model of Daily Highs and Lows, March 2006 
 
1696 Scott Alan Carson, African-American and White Living Standards in the 19
th Century 
American South: A Biological Comparison, March 2006 
 
1697 Helge Berger, Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB, March 2006 
 
1698 Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra and Frans van Winden, On the Size of the Winning Set in 
the Presence of Interest Groups, April 2006 
 
1699 Martin Gassebner, Michael Lamla and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Economic, Demographic and 
Political Determinants of Pollution Reassessed: A Sensitivity Analysis, April 2006 
 
1700 Louis N. Christofides and Amy Chen Peng, Major Provisions of Labour Contracts and 
their Theoretical Coherence, April 2006 
 
1701 Christian Groth, Karl-Josef Koch and Thomas M. Steger, Rethinking the Concept of 
Long-Run Economic Growth, April 2006 
 
  
1702 Dirk Schindler and Guttorm Schjelderup, Company Tax Reform in Europe and its 
Effect on Collusive Behavior, April 2006 
 
1703 Françoise Forges and Enrico Minelli, Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets, April 
2006 
 
1704 M. Hashem Pesaran, Ron P. Smith, Takashi Yamagata and Liudmyla Hvozdyk, 
Pairwise Tests of Purchasing Power Parity Using Aggregate and Disaggregate Price 
Measures, April 2006 
 
1705 Piero Gottardi and Felix Kubler, Social Security and Risk Sharing, April 2006 
 
1706 Giacomo Corneo and Christina M. Fong, What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive 
Justice?, April 2006 
 
1707 Andreas Knabe, Ronnie Schoeb and Joachim Weimann, Marginal Employment 
Subsidization: A New Concept and a Reappraisal, April 2006 
 
1708 Hans-Werner Sinn, The Pathological Export Boom and the Bazaar Effect - How to 
Solve the German Puzzle, April 2006 
 
1709 Helge Berger and Stephan Danninger, The Employment Effects of Labor and Product 
Markets Deregulation and their Implications for Structural Reform, May 2006 
 
1710 Michael Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher, Global Financial Transmission of Monetary 
Policy Shocks, May 2006 
 
1711 Carsten Eckel and Hartmut Egger, Wage Bargaining and Multinational Firms in General 
Equilibrium, May 2006 
 
1712 Mathias Hoffmann, Proprietary Income, Entrepreneurial Risk, and the Predictability of 
U.S. Stock Returns, May 2006 
 
1713 Marc-Andreas Muendler and Sascha O. Becker, Margins of Multinational Labor 
Substitution, May 2006 
 
1714 Surajeet Chakravarty and W. Bentley MacLeod, Construction Contracts (or “How to 
Get the Right Building at the Right Price?”), May 2006 
 
1715 David Encaoua and Yassine Lefouili, Choosing Intellectual Protection: Imitation, Patent 
Strength and Licensing, May 2006 
 
1716 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 
Empirical Estimation Results of a Collective Household Time Allocation Model, May 
2006 
 
1717 Paul De Grauwe and Agnieszka Markiewicz, Learning to Forecast the Exchange Rate: 
Two Competing Approaches, May 2006 